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 This paper summarizes core aspects that marked the history of the Brazilian 
Landless Movement (MST), in recent years. It tries to demonstrate that nowadays 
the organization is experiencing mounting impasses, in part because of 
urbanization and its impacts on social perceptions about the trajectory of land 
reform in Brazil. Typical problematic aspects of the Movement are checklisted and 
briefly discussed, from organizational choices to the MST’s controversial repertoire 
of struggles implemented to enhance its political clout. The text also refers to 
challenges recently observed, which threatens the very existence of the 
organization in the near future.    
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Trapped in a series of controversial actions, ranging from the destruction of 
thousands of orange trees in an invaded commercial farm to shocking news about 
illegal deforestation in rural settlements, and under the threat of a Congress 
investigation, not mentioning endless additional actions, many of them carried out 
under no apparent or reasonable political rationale, the Brazilian Landless 
Movement (MST) is currently facing a challenging juncture in its trajectory.  
Those cited actions occurred in the state of São Paulo and are highlighted 
here as recent illustrations (October 2009) out of a long list of erratic initiatives by 
the MST over the last ten years. The first mentioned invasion was carried out in a 
farm of Cutrale, one of the biggest Brazilian exporters of orange juice.  Inside the 
farm, the militants destroyed approximately 7,000 trees of oranges. Using a 
helicopter, the state police filmed it. Showed later on Brazilian television networks it 
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produced an enormous wave of criticism. The MST alleged that the farm had been 
illegally appropriated by Cutrale in the past, but this claim was completely 
overshadowed by the absurd destruction of that cultivated area3. The second case 
is more emblematic of MST’s zigzagging strategy in recent years and refers to an 
area devastated in one rural settlement where a load equivalent to ten thousand 
trucks of Pinus was sold but a substantial part of the money vanished4. 
Environmental malpractices are nowadays rife in rural settlements, from Rio Grande 
do Sul and Santa Catarina, in the South, to the Northern states, where rural 
settlements multiplied after the national program of land reform took off in 1995. 
Settlements in the Northern region have substantially contributed to the high level 
of deforestation in that part of the Amazon basin. In recent years, the main 
government goal has been to concentrate its search for new areas for redistribution 
in that region because of low land prices and the availability of public land. Out of 
all land collected for land reform in the period 1995-2008, 27% of the total was 
allocated in only two northern states (Pará and Maranhão). Although not being the 
single cause, this concentration of settlements has been one of the main causes for 
deforestation, according to one specialist in the region:  
 
(…) many of the migrants [from other states] seeking land have become 
‘sem terras’ [landless], or members of organized groups such as the 
Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST). Migration from Maranhão 
has completely transformed the central portion of the state of Pará, 
centered on [the town of] Marabá. This entire area is now degraded, 
including every fragment of forest left in the deforested landscape 
(Fearnside, 2008, p.24).   
 
Another report, published in 2006 by an influential environmental NGO, 
calls attention to the same problem but is still more emphatic about the impacts of 
rural settlements installed in the region as a consequence of the national program: 
 
‘(…) Since the late 1970s, landless and urban poor have pressured the 
government for lands (…) The average growth of families in the Legal 
Amazon participating in agrarian reform projects was 52,500 families 
per year between 1994 (161,500 families) and 2002 (528,571 families). 
Each family has user rights to holdings between 50 and 100 ha. The 
federal government also provides subsidies to agrarian reform settlers in 
the form of food allowances, money for housing and credit at reduced 
interest rates. Combined with the adjudication of legal rights, this makes 
agrarian reform settlers more prone to deforest than small scale settlers 
elsewhere. Timber sales also make the initial occupation of such projects 
attractive for landless people. However, after the depletion of timber 
resources, household income tends to be relatively low. Thus, many 
families abandon or illegally sell their lots to seek new settlement areas 
or migrate to urban centers. An estimated 50-60 percent of land in 
agrarian reform plots in southern Pará has been illegally sold. Some of 
this land becomes consolidated in larger land holdings, which tend to be 
                                                 
3 See http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u634605.shtml [Accessed in 20 October 
2009]. 
4 O Estado de São Paulo, 4 November 2009. 
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more economically efficient and profitable (Barreto et al, 2006, pp.29-
31, emphasis added).  
 
These trends and facts ignited a series of reactions. In the Brazilian National 
Congress there is a strong multi-partisan group of MPs who have rural businesses 
and act as a coherent lobby (so-called ‘bancada ruralista’) whenever threats against 
their interests come up in the form of government policies, proposed laws and so 
on. They are said to be an estimate 20% of the total number of MPs and function 
as a single body when their interests might be affected. In 2007, as an illustration, 
the group was able to mobilize enough votes in the Congress to defeat an 
constitutional amendment (PEC 438/2001). That proposal stipulated that any rural 
property using slave labor would be outrightly expropriated and transferred to the 
national land reform program. Under the lobby of the ‘bancada’, however, MPs 
turned down this amendment by a large majority.5 From time to time they try to 
enforce a legal mechanism called ‘Legislative Commission of Investigation’ (CPI), 
which has some power to investigate problems or facts of any sort. The Cutrale 
incident gave them convincing arguments to formally constitute this legislative 
initiative in order to shed lights on the internal function of the Movement. One of 
these investigations was approved in December 2009 and was supposed to work in 
the following six months.     
This scenario perhaps suggests an appropriate timing to offer a succinct 
balance about the Movement, a quarter of century after its foundation. Since I 
have been studying the organization even before the meeting that established it in 
January 1984, I list below arguments and empirical evidence about key subjects, 
qua theses, for those who may have interest in rural social processes in Brazil and, 
in particular, for those who are curious about the main facets surrounding the 
history of the Movement. Its roots, in fact, go back to land conflicts in Rio Grande 
do Sul in the late 1970s (Medeiros, 1989). Only to clarify, from a legal point of 
view the MST does not exist, for it is not registered in any state domain, like other 
associations, trade unions, cooperatives or other organizations of civil society. This 
was a decision taken by its leaders from the beginning and is still its condition to 
date. In order to enjoy access to public funds and receive international donations, 
the Movement created several satellite organizations that are legally registered.6    
The organization was (and has been) easily romanticized in most of the 
literature. In particular, in texts published outside Brazil apologetic readings about 
the MST abound.7 Even rigorous researchers are sometimes taken in by the MST 
                                                 
5 Folha de São Paulo, 21 October 2007. 
6 Only to illustrate, from 2003 to the end of 2008, it was discovered that 43 NGOs linked to the 
MST received nearly US$ 90 million from the federal government (Folha de São Paulo, 29 March 
2009). 
7 In my view the most accurate account of the MST in English is the book by Branford and Rocha 
(2002). On the other extreme, reflecting poor and highly ideologized analysis, examples are 
abundant either in Brazil or abroad. Paradigmatic illustrations by foreign authors are Harnecker 
(2002); Veltmeyer and Petras (2002), not to list several rosy comments in New Left Review, still 
assuming, two decades after its internal restructuring, that the MST is a social movement (to 
exemplify this point, check the uncritical interview with the leader of the Movement, published in 
number 15, May-June 2002, p. 76-104).   
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propaganda. Wolford, for example, cites that  “the movement has organized over 
230,000 land occupations and overseen the creation of approximately 1,200 
agrarian reform settlements (…) Partially as a result of these successes, MST’s 
membership has increased from several hundred in 1984 to over one million 
today” (Wolford, 2003, 500-501). These figures taken from the literature divulged 
by the Movement are obvious numerical fantasies, in particular the fantastic 
number about its constituency. The MST is not a membership-based organization 
and does not list its rank-and-file. Ondetti also argues that “The landless 
movement had become arguably the largest rural movement in Brazilian history 
and one of the most influential social movements in Brazilian history, rural or 
urban” (2006, 61). An overexaggeration, it must be clarified that the largest 
organization of ‘the rural poor’ in Brazil is (by far) the rural trade union movement 
of small farmers and petty producers. As early as 1963, for example, the regional 
trade unions in the states of Paraíba and Pernambuco were able to recruit 
approximately 100,000 workers in the then dominant sugar cane agricultural 
regions, thus promoting the biggest rural strike ever in Brazilian history (Martins, 
1981; Medeiros, 1989).   
In face of so much confusing evidence and the cant of speculative writing 
about the MST, it may be useful to present a more down to earth checklist of core 
aspects that describe the Movement and speak more crudely about its political 
realities and recent developments, apart from suggesting possible outcomes in the 
near future. It must be noted that some parts of this article are not supported 
either by published results of research or known empirical facts thus recurring in 
passing to “arguments of authority”. Whereas this mode of explanation is surely 
not appropriate in any rigorous scientific endeavor or in academic publications, in 
this particular case this is unavoidable. This occasional lack of proofs of evidence 
reflects, in fact, a political strategy by the Landless Movement, which has been 
quite successful in all phases of its history to control academic research in their 
(many) sites of action or influence. Limitations to autonomous research in rural 
settlements or social gatherings and events sponsored by the Movement are 
notorious and most independent social scientists who study agrarian issues in Brazil 
have incidents to describe (for a recent illustration, check Deslandes, 2009). Even 
more crucially, the organization has been highly effective in developing 
unconditional political alliances with a good number of university researchers, in 
Brazil and elsewhere, with the practical effect that the latter ones uncritically accept 
official interpretations divulged by the Movement, reproduced in countless articles 
and documents, frequently with no factual support. Most of the literature about 
land struggles and the MST in Brazil, as a result, is apologetic and too distant from 
social realities.8 In this article, as emphasized above, I have counted upon my 
                                                 
8 As an example, there are dozens of dissertations and PhD thesis by Brazilians that attempt to 
analyse social processes in rural settlements controlled by the MST. The vast majority, however, are 
relevant only when describing empirical contexts in different parts of the country but most authors 
seems incapable of independent analysis centred on a safe distance from their object of study. I am 
not suggesting the possibility of neutrality here, but an analytical effort to evaluate social processes 
without the ideological blinkers imposed ex-ante by the MST. Anyone familiar with political 
processes in Brazil is surprised with the swift conformity adopted by researchers (most of urban 
extraction and unaware of the multifaceted aspects of rural social life and agricultural production) 
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empirical experience of more than thirty years with the Movement, mainly in the 
Brazilian South, but also with a series of research experiences in other parts of the 
country.9  
It must be also emphasized, as a relevant clarification in these prolegomena 
that the article appears to be normative in some of its parts. Although this should 
be avoided as a general principle in academic research, this is inescapable in this 
specific case. The Landless Movement is one of the most active political 
organizations in Brazil and, as such, it commonly disseminates political proposals 
and directives on various aspects of social life. As a political organization but also as 
a result of its authoritarian internal structure, by definition all arguments by the 
Movement are normative. It is a challenge, as a result, to discuss its social and 
political trajectory without recurrence to only alternative non-normative faces of 
those tenets espoused by the organization. Especially when discussing political 
facets of controversial or difficult empirical verification, this aspect of the article 
appears inevitable. 
This article proposes sixteen theses that either directly focus on the 
Movement or a related theme that closely reverberate on the organization, the last 
thesis being a speculation about the immediate future of the MST that is analyzed 
in the conclusion. Those propositions are contained in three sections which are 
roughly separated also in a chronological sequence. The first part highlights some 
key aspects in the history of the Movement, including a brief comment about the 
most dense and influential moment in its activity, the ‘march towards Brasília’ in 
April, 1997. The second section lists changes produced as a result of the MST’s 
proactive role in Brazilian politics in the last ten to fifteen years. In particular, its 
remarkable operational capacity to build a public image that is far greater than its 
real dimension. Finally, the third part puts into prominence the problematic course 
pursued by the organization in the last decade. In fact, events in the period have 
perhaps demonstrated the fatal combination of two processes: on the one hand, 
the impact of ‘triumphalism’, after the successes obtained in the late 1990s and the 
ensuing lack of an appropriated political vision for the following period and, on the 
other hand, the impact of urbanization and the diminishing social scope for land 
reform in Brazil.      
         
                                                                                                                                                
when dealing with the militants of the organization and their uncritical subordination to the “official 
discourse”.  
9 Perhaps I am the only Brazilian social scientist who has ever had the privilege of keeping an office 
in the MST headquarters. It happened over the 1980s, in the city of Porto Alegre, where the 
Movement was firstly established, before moving late in that decade to São Paulo. During those 
years I acted as the regional coordinator of the Brazilian Association for Land Reform (ABRA, in its 
Portuguese acronym). I proposed to organize a centre of documentation about rural issues with my 
university students, all volunteers attracted by the then epic political effort by the landless activists 
and thus enjoyed a close relation with its leaders, discussions, materials, internal disputes, debates 
about strategies, and so on. I also established many friendships inside the Movement and in the 
newly formed settlements, a range of personal relations and contacts that I still have the honour to 
maintain to date. Later on, in the following decade, the organization never allowed again such a 
free movement inside its spaces of control and gradually established rigid control on all research 
initiatives.   
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The Landless Movement: historical features 
 
About its nature: despite the official name, the MST was not a proper social 
movement for a long time. It soon structured itself as a formal organization after 
1984, highly centralized when it concerns the most crucial aspects (such as the 
route of political struggle or the choices of banners and adversaries), but somewhat 
decentralized when secondary aspects are at stake, thus freeing the creativity that 
stimulates local actions. This turn towards a formal structure occurred in the second 
semester of 1986 and is easily proved: one must only compare the issues of the 
MST newspaper (‘Jornal dos Sem Terra’) before and after that period. In December 
of that year, the leadership purged the then journalists employed by the 
Movement and hired new ones who from then on transformed the publication into 
a typical instrument of political propaganda rigidly loyal to the ideological premises 
of its national leadership. From a plural publication when discussing rural social 
processes, it rapidly evolved into a one-line newspaper typical of Stalinist-style 
organizations. On that same occasion, the leadership changed hands, from a 
dominant rule by Catholic mediators to the landless leaders themselves, who had 
been nurtured in the precedent years (Navarro, 2002).  
This quasi-controlled decentralization explains why some local actions 
sometimes are baffling, either for their audacity or their apparent political 
nonsense. There are, for example, frequent invasions of toll stations on privatized 
roads in the Southern state of Paraná, where the current state governor supports a 
tacit alliance with the Movement and stimulates those actions. In some 
Northeastern states, on the other hand, the MST promotes regular looting of 
different goods carried by trucks in the main roads. In Pernambuco, also in that 
region, the Movement invaded and destroyed in 2006 a farm dedicated to ostrich-
raising under the argument that this animal was alien to the Brazilian fauna. 
Especially in 2007, in Minas Gerais (centre of Brazil) and in Pará (in the North), 
militants have stormed trains of the biggest Brazilian private firm, Vale do Rio 
Doce, one of largest mining exporters in the world, demanding its privatization’s 
reversal (privatization occurred in 1997). In Pará this blockade stopped the 
industrial production of iron ore pellets by Vale and caused an immense financial 
loss. To finish this action, the MST then produced a long list of demands, including 
the rise of a state tax. At the moment Vale is supposed to transfer 3% of its net 
revenues obtained in that industrial activity for the local state and the MST 
demanded it to be risen to 10%. Curiously enough, the state of Pará is currently 
governed by the Workers Party and the local governor has systematically ignored 
legal warrants to enforce the eviction of MST invaders in several rural properties.10 
Much more tragic, however, is the growing number of cases dealing with physical 
intimidation of settlers in areas under control of the Movement, not to mention a 
new face of violence shown by militants who are prepared to kill opponents.11 
                                                 
10 Gazeta Mercantil, 20 October 2007 
11 See, as an example, the case occurred in Pernambuco, where landless militants murdered four 
workers who were in charge of a farm they tried to invade. For a brief comment, check 
http://jbonline.terra.com.br/nextra/2009/02/28/e280217645.asp [Accessed in 15 August 2009].  
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Surveys have demonstrated that public opinion shows a clear disapproval of these 
actions but the MST seems to disdain it (to be discussed later). Perhaps the gross 
mistake of all was epitomised in the invasion in 2002 of the medium-sized farm of 
former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, amidst the presidential campaign of 
that year. There was a public uproar against this invasion and national leaders were 
forced to criticize their fellow regional leaders.  
From a sociological point of view, social movements entail a flexible 
leadership and some degree of political spontaneity when implementing a 
repertoire of social struggles, but since the mid-1980s these are characteristics far 
from being intrinsic of the MST format. The obvious organizational model that 
inspired it was the Leninist-type political party. On the other hand, collective 
bodies structured as organizations, among other features, forcibly establish internal 
careers, and nowadays the Movement mobilizes a good number of militants who 
are not able to conduct other activities but social agitation. 
It must be noted, however, that it is impossible to estimate the actual 
number of militants under the sway of the Movement. Even its national leaders 
have no idea about either how many militants (full-time or not) are registered in 
the MST payroll or are merely under its influence and organizational umbrella. The 
reason lies in the limitless forms of attachment to the organization, from those who 
are linked to the national existing structures (communication, education, 
propaganda, international relations and so on) to those who work in the states or, 
even more remotely, proselytize in rural areas and rural settlements on behalf of 
the Movement and receive a payment from different sources. Frequently, a full-
time militant is employed by the government (at different levels in the country), 
and transfers part of the wages to the organization. There are many cooperatives 
or NGOs that do the same: they are legal and strive for funds in several public 
programs, if they are successful, large part goes to the MST. In particular after the 
mid-1990s, the MST was successful in finding opportunities inside the State and 
gradually became a ‘para-state’ organization increasingly dependent on public 
funds. It meant that selected militants colonized several state spaces in order to 
extract funds or make pressures to turn those spaces into favorable domains of 
political influence. Throughout the country that was by then the main strategy: to 
conquer whenever possible parts of the state in order to promote the organization. 
These links take several forms, from a humble teacher in a primary school in a 
remote rural settlement employed by the local municipality to more active militants 
nominated to run for political positions (city councilors, mayors, and members of 
parliament). Above all, especially after 2003, when President Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva came into power, the MST made huge efforts to allocate as many militants as 
possible in different positions inside the federal state machine.12      
 
The life and times of the MST: in practice, the organization was effectively 
born in the second half of the 1990s, when it forged its entrée into the national 
                                                 
12 I have commented on this strategy in a long interview published in O Estado de São Paulo, 29 
April 2007. 
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agenda of rural issues, in particular land reform. Before that, it was active mainly in 
the South and relatively unknown in the rest of the country. Also in that occasion, 
it altered its main funding channels, which were by then covered by the generous 
purse of European churches. The MST gradually spotted the existing leaks, 
resources and opportunities within State agencies and programs. This change was 
particularly materialized after the start of the national program of land reform (in 
1995) and the sympathetic openness shown by the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development (also from that year onwards), not to list other public sources, from 
which the Movement has increasingly been able to extract funds, via surrogate 
organizations. Fuelled by these favorable contexts, the MST escalated its actions 
over the last decade with unparalleled political vigor. Comparato studied the 
impact of those pressures in the coverage by the mainstream press and 
demonstrated the surge of news about the Movement in the mid-1990s, with a 
peak in 1997 (Comparato, 2001, 110). It must be noted that the national program 
was also launched because of much pressure exerted by the MST.  The Ministry, 
however, under a different name, was an innovation by the first civil presidency 
after the end of the military regime (in 1985).13 The MST still receives substantial 
funds from European donors, but national sources have eventually become the 
lion’s share of its total budget. 
Land invasions swelled in those years. From 398 cases in 1996, they jumped 
to 599 two years later, the highest number of invasions landless groups have ever 
promoted in Brazil. In the last decade, however, those figures were substantially 
reduced and in 2009 (January to 15 November) land invasions reached 231 cases – 
one third of them only in the state of São Paulo. It should be noted that with the 
years passing these figures about land invasions partially lost their actual meaning 
and relevance. The Movement detected a gradual reduction in repressive counter-
measures taken by the State as a direct by-product of political democratization in 
the country. As a result, the organization gradually mobilized fewer militants and 
sympathizers when organizing the invasion of a given property. Figures about 
participants involved in each land invasion have usually been overestimated by the 
MST and are unreliable. Even so, anecdotal evidence suggests a clear tendency to 
mobilize fewer participants, if the second part of the 1990s is compared to the 
recent period.14  
                                                 
13 The strongest and oldest political force fighting for land reform in Brazil has been the rural trade 
union organization. However, from the mid-1990s onwards, the MST entered the stage benefitted 
by a series of favourable events and became much more influential. On competing organizations, 
check Favareto (2006). 
14 Ondetti has proposed a rather different interpretation about the emergence of the MST into 
Brazilian politics in the mid-1990s. Relying on the literature about social movements, he argues that 
‘this study identifies a particular causal mechanism through which repression can trigger greater 
protest’ (2006, 62) and goes on to suggest that repressive measures against the MST in that 
decade, in fact, explains why the Movement was reinvigorated later on. In face of the political 
exuberance of Brazilian democratization in the same period, this analysis does not fit political events 
on that occasion. Especially in the second part of the 1990s, Brazilian democracy reached a especial 
moment and a vigorous debate developed on how to deepen new social and political practices in all 
fields of society. Actions to repress the MST did occur in some states and the massacres of 
Corumbiara and Eldorado dos Carajás are telling examples. But to establish a causal mechanism 
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Missing a political opportunity: the ‘March towards Brasília’ in April 1997 
was the only event prepared by a popular organization that really embarrassed the 
government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), who was then forced to 
open the doors of the presidential palace to the delegation of landless 
representatives headed by the founder of the Movement, João Pedro Stédile. That 
occasion might have be the finest hour to institutionalize and democratize the 
MST, then enjoying the apex of its influence and prestige. The march was the 
biggest public event ever organized by the Movement and is said to have been 
attended by approximately 100,000 protesters in the capital, Brasília. It was 
intended to denounce the morose investigations about the massacre of landless 
workers in the Amazon municipality of Eldorado dos Carajás, in 1996. Since then 
the MST has annually intensified actions in that month, later called ‘Red April’ by 
the press.15 
The march could have produced far-reaching consequences, if the 
organization had decided to transform itself into a robust structure to champion the 
interests of the rural poorest in Brazil. Its leaders, however, insisted on its semi-
clandestine status, a bizarre contrast with the rest of the Brazilian society which 
was then experiencing a vibrant process of democratization. Unsurprisingly, from 
then on the political dilemmas faced by the MST have multiplied, because this 
political antinomy could hardly prosper with the years.  
There are some who dismiss the depth of recent Brazilian democratization 
and insist that this possible political decision by the MST might be a trap thrown in 
order to capture it into the conservative web of Brazilian politics. Whereas the so-
called ‘democratic order’ in capitalist societies is a daunting challenge for radical 
political organizations (finely discussed, for example, in the writings of Gramsci and 
others), the argument here follows a different line. From those years onwards 
gradually developed a growing political inconsistency opposing on the one side 
reformist, left-leaned organizations and parties and radicalized sectors of Brazilian 
society, which were betting in a new Brazilian political spring that could boost 
social transformations the country. On the other side, only the Movement persisted 
in its semi-clandestine and non-democratic structure, but kept demanding 
‘democracy’ for all political organizations when, at the same time, ignoring this 
political facet in its internal rationale. It is curious that sympathizers of the 
Movement still argue that there is here no political contradiction of any sort and 
insist that Brazilian democracy did not experience any change worth the name in 
recent times.16   
MST’s political alliances within Brazilian society: they flourished by the end 
of the last decade, but are drying in recent years. It appears that the Brazilian 
                                                                                                                                                
making repression as a trigger to enhance the Movement’s political might is a false reading about 
that specific political juncture in Brazil.  
15 About the march, see Chaves (2000). For a recent account about the massacre of Eldorado dos 
Carajás, check Nepomuceno (2007).  
16 Literature about political democratization in Brazil is abundant, but the recent books by Leonardo 
Avritzer, one of the most reputed Brazilian political scientists suffice to demonstrate how far has 
been the scope of those social and political changes in the country (Avritzer, 2009, 2002). 
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society has become gradually tired of so much non-democratic turmoil by the 
Movement. Born in the politically promising field built over time by the Workers 
Party, where it is firmly rooted, even the party appears to be increasingly 
exhausted with an authoritarian organization that lost its reason of existence and 
seems to act at random, especially after becoming a weakened actor that does not 
command its specific agenda anymore. Nowadays the MST receives limited public 
approval: it is mainly supported by sectors of radicalized Catholics, some trade 
unions, small groups of researchers in public universities, some factions within the 
Left-leaned parties and, above all, by sectors of university students. 
The most illuminating poll ever carried out about the opinion of Brazilians in 
relation to the MST and its actions was released by IBOPE in November 2009. 
IBOPE is the oldest and perhaps the most reputed polling company in Brazil and 
the statistical rationale of this survey appears to be reliable. If confirmed by 
additional surveys in the near future, its findings are devastating for the 
Movement. They interviewed 2,002 citizens in different parts of the country (16 
years old and after) stratified according to different classes, levels of income, 
regions, ages, sex, marital status and levels of schooling (IBOPE, 2009).  
It is notable that while the Brazilians strongly support land reform (90% 
answered that ‘The MST must fight for land reform but without recurring to 
violence and land invasions’), they also clearly condemned the recourse to 
invasions by the organization (92% answered that land invasions were ‘illegal’). It 
is also relevant to note that the insistence by the Movement over the years in 
making a political distinction of ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’, arguing that the latter 
are morally justifiable in face of Brazilian history produced so far hardly any 
repercussion among Brazilians, for 89% considered those acts as ‘invasions’ and 
only 9% as ‘land occupations’.17 It is also relevant that while the sample approves 
the left-leaned mandate of President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva (80%), those 
interviewed show, however, the ingrained conservatism of Brazilian society, 
because the rates of approval that follow shows the Army (79%), the Catholic 
Church (74%) and the evangelical churches (69%), the police (63%) and so on. 
The MST has the approval of only 27% of those interviewed and a vast majority 
associates the Movement with negative images, such as invasions (69%) and 
violence (53%) and is ‘incoherent with its discourse’ (67%). Even more relevant, 
60% of those interviewed think that the MST creates difficulties for the 
implementation of land reform in Brazil (32% think, on the contrary, that the 
organization helps its implementation) and, more broadly, with percentages in the 
range of 69% to 81% the interviewees asserted that the actions by the MST are 
harmful to different aspects, such as the political development of Brazil, 
employment, social development in the country, the economy, exports, foreign 
investments, and the image of Brazil abroad (IBOPE, 2009, passim).    
                                                 
17 As an ethnographic observation of political relevance, this nuanced difference in those two words 
has major political overtones for sociological research about the Movement. The use of ‘invasion’ 
(instead of ‘occupation’) by a given researcher in his/her writing results in an immediate political 
label attached to this person and compromise any further research in rural settlements or other 
spaces under the influence of the Movement. In reality, this is a puerile distinction in conceptual 
terms, but the MST eventually uses it to segment potential allies and independent researchers.   
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Land struggles and the dynamics of Brazilian politics 
 
Public illusions (1): the apparent size of the MST is by far larger than its real 
expression and this is one of its most instrumental tools to warrant public visibility. 
Taking creative advantage of allies and spaces within society (such as friendly trade 
unions, for example), it heightens facts and events of no major significance, 
thereby introducing itself as a larger-than-real political force. Foreigners commonly 
make confusion with this political parallax. Abroad one may read with some 
frequency the pompous but false phrase about the ‘largest social movement in the 
world’. Not only does the MST appear bigger than its actual size, but it has, in fact, 
observed a reduction in its capacity of mobilization in recent years. If carefully 
analyzed, land occupations and other public actions have shrunk in their total over 
the years and in their size and number of participants. In the past, land invasions in 
most rural regions would usually require no less than 400-500 participants (so that 
immediate police repression would be improbable), whereas nowadays one finds 
successful invasions carried out with less than one hundred participants. 
A good historical example is the case of Rio Grande do Sul, where the 
Movement ‘tested’ the humor of authorities in the years of 1983-84 and in 
October 1985 promoted the biggest land invasion ever in that state (approximately 
6.5 thousand invaders), a numerical demonstration of the immense political 
challenges to enter private property in those years. More recently, however, the 
organization is not mobilizing more than a handful of militants to freely invade any 
private property in the state, with much constrained police repression and Justice 
measures taken to re-integrate the property to the owner. In spite of these more 
cautious comfortable political contexts, not only land occupations by the MST 
diminished substantially with the passing of the time but also the number of 
participants in each case, as noted earlier.  
Moreover, if it were empirically viable to verify, one would conclude that 
the majority of these actions mobilize especially members of rural families already 
settled (that is, landholders), who are usually recruited under a broad spectrum of 
intimidation forms by MST militants. The word intimidation will surprise 
uninformed readers. Unfortunately this is a precise term to designate how the MST 
has forcibly mobilized a significant part of rural settlements families to participate in 
mass demonstrations and related actions. Nowadays the Movement has partial 
control of INCRA, the government agency in charge of implementing land reform 
in the country.  In fact it is the MST that decides on who receives public funds in a 
vast number of settlements. This financial arm is too powerful and easily 
intimidates poor rural families in the settlements, apart from imposing their actual 
options in the sphere of political action.18        
                                                 
18 Faced by the ample presence of MST militants in state positions, it is curious that the total land 
collected for land reform was substantially reduced during the two mandates of President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva. During the eight years of the previous president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
fiercely criticized by the MST under the shadow of the Workers Party, the annual average of land 
collected for land reform was 1,284,672 hectares, according to official data of INCRA (with a peak 
of 2,256,310 hectares expropriated and/or bought for land reform in 1998). Over the seven years 
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Public illusions (2): in recent years the proliferation of landless groups has 
been observed and new acronyms have invaded the pages of newspapers, thus 
implying an apparent exacerbation of ‘the agrarian question’. Far from reality, 
these are minor and transient groups, formed only to either secure access to 
occasional government projects or resulting from the action of an opportunist local 
leader attracted by a promising context, both possibilities developed outside the 
MST umbrella and mirroring local particularities. This is the reason why one finds 
an array of abbreviations in some states, thus reflecting, in fact, creativity to take 
advantage of local opportunities. However, none of these small groups of landless 
workers has any chance of surviving the years.  The reason is obvious: none of 
them has the solid government alliances and, most important, the historical support 
of sectors of the Catholic Church which the MST has enjoyed from its inception. 
This dual relation secures to the Movement a pool of money and followers, which 
are the essential ingredients of its political durability. Its presence within 
government circles assures permanent funds to match its financial needs and its 
historical association with the Church guarantees the ideological bless of the most 
powerful institution that ever existed in the Brazilian history.19  
Public illusions (3): is the MST a ‘progressive organization’? Prima facie, no 
one would dispute that claim from various angles. It mobilizes the rural poor and 
fight for a policy historically cherished by progressive sectors in the country. 
Moreover, its political orientation is embedded in the Left jargon and its leaders are 
always repeating words and expressions typical of socialist traditions. I will not 
insist in discussing neither its choice of an authoritarian format that copied the 
most traumatic socialist experiences nor the lack of internal democracy that 
prevents any glimpse of transparency and accountability. Perhaps it is enough to 
note the following:  
(a) Since its foundation the Movement insisted in boasting its goal of ‘gender 
democracy’ and its pledge to stimulate equal opportunities for women inside the 
organization. It is an unfortunate reality, however, that it is an unfulfilled promise 
to date. Women rarely gained positions in the decision-making structure and 
personal ethnographic observations have demonstrated that those who became 
regional leaders were forced to use a ‘male language’ in order to be heard. Even 
more serious, they had to abandon altogether any intention of discussing ‘gender 
specificities’ (see, for examples of gender discrimination inside the Movement, Rua 
and Abramovay, 2000, Deslandes, 2009). A revealing evidence of this patriarchal 
                                                                                                                                                
of Lula’s two mandates, however, that average fell abruptly to 487,117 hectares (with a nadir of 
incredible 6,478 hectares collected for land reform in 2008). One wonders about the reasons: 
general incompetence by government agencies, a greater difficulty to collect land in face of higher 
land prices and/or lower number of properties that could be expropriated according to legal criteria, 
or, more crucially, a reduced social demand for access to land?    
19 According to NERA, the research unit that collects data on land struggles located at the 
Universidade Estadual de São Paulo, from 2000 to 2007, 89 landless ‘movements’ organized at least 
one land invasion in Brazil. The MST was by far the most active one and responded for the majority 
of those invasions (see O Estado de São Paulo, 17 May, 2009). Only in Pernambuco Rosa (2004) 
reported the existence of 14 of these small groups organizing land invasions in 2003. 
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dominance is the literature produced by the Movement, where references to 
‘typical topics’ discussed in feminist circles or women’s movements are hardly 
mentioned;  
(b) In recent years, searching desperately for a new agenda,  the MST launched 
attacks on GMOs and all ‘conventional models of science’, including scathing 
criticisms on the type of research programs pursued by public agencies of 
agricultural research.20 However, these anti-science criticisms are rather puzzling 
when one observes that in all rural settlements under the influence of the 
organization where soybeans are cultivated, farmers rely on GMO seeds. It is 
impossible to categorically prove this assertion and it is made after several visits to 
settlements in various agricultural regions where GMOs could be used and also 
after confirmation by MST militants. Additional evidence lies the fact that in the 
2009/2010 crop soybean GMOs in Brazil may have used to cover nearly 70% of 
the total area cultivated according to different estimates (Folha de São Paulo, 12 
December 2009).   
(c) It is a merit of the Movement to have developed from the beginning its ‘Sector 
of Education’, when one remembers how poor and neglected is this policy in 
Brazilian rural areas. For some years, the MST summoned militants and 
implemented a program destined to eradicate illiteracy in settlements under its 
control, an initiative that was widely applauded. But the Movement also structured 
those educational initiatives aiming at recruiting and training youth who would 
eventually become loyal militants. After external criticism on rigid indoctrination, 
the reaction of the Movement has been to insist in its ‘victimization’. It fiercely 
positions itself against any external evaluation and even refuses the idea of 
unplanned visits to its schools formed in so many rural settlements.  
Again, ignoring for the moment other critical aspects, one may ask if an 
organization that is so scornful of gender democracy, disputes the very idea of 
science and promotes political indoctrination of young settlers may still be called a 
progressive champion of the poor.      
 
Public illusions (4): this is a thesis that may be succinctly presented. In short: 
there is no real coalition of popular organizations with agrarian interests in Brazil 
under Via Campesina. The idea of small organizations grouped under this collective 
is ludicrous and causes perplexity to anyone familiar with rural organizations in 
Brazil.  Suggestions found in the literature about the MST’s presumable capacity of 
attracting sister rural organizations do not correspond to political realities.21 In 
summary, it is enough to say that Via Campesina in Brazil is the MST tout court 
and the other names cited as part of it refer to virtually non-existent groups or 
                                                 
20 The national agency for agricultural research (Embrapa) has often been criticised by the 
Movement as ‘an agent of agribusiness’, in spite of the fact that it is highly reckoned (both 
nationally and internationally) as one of the most successful government research agencies in Brazil.  
21 As an example, see the deplorable book by Desmarais (2007). Although it is also apologetic, the 
article by Martínez-Torres and Rosset (2010) is more accurate when explaining the origins and 
development of this coalition.  
 
 REDES, Santa Cruz do Sul, v. 15, n. 1, p. 196 - 223, jan./abr. 2010 
209 
merely satellites of the Landless Movement, in all cases with no social basis worth 
the name. Only to illustrate the so-called ‘Movement of Small Farmers’ (MPA), 
usually cited as an autonomous organization under the umbrella of Via Campesina, 
is merely the trade union arm of the MST. It was formed in the late 1990s under 
the inspiration of Father Sérgio Gorgën, one of the main leaders of the Movement 
in Rio Grande do Sul. It was noted the growing difficulty of mobilizing landless 
workers in that state (nowadays a negligible social category in that part of Brazil) 
and the MST then decided to organize the MPA as new political initiative to keep a 
reasonable influence in the state. Later on it was decided to form branches in other 
states. Again, this is another example of a political mechanism intended to spin out 
the idea of ‘social support’ when, in fact, it is much narrower in reality.    
 
The ‘demonization’ of the MST: frequent denunciations about initiatives 
that are presumably destined to ‘criminalize’ the organization are foolish. It is 
certain that there are sectors of the agrarian bourgeoisie who would wish to 
liquidate the MST, as a reflection of their historical political truculence, but they are 
irrelevant in their social expression and geographically too dispersed to represent a 
real threat to the Movement.22 On the other hand, claims about criminalization 
sound illogical, in face of endless illicit acts by the MST. Is the model for Brazil a 
sort of democracy under which the legal predicaments are not contingent on some 
actors? Victimization is a known (and clever) tactic used by popular social 
movements or organizations to amass social solidarity and gain leverage vis-à-vis 
political opponents, but the MST has trivialized it to a point that hardly produces 
any reverberations in the Brazilian society in these days. As discussed earlier after 
the recent IBOPE survey, the vast majority of Brazilians is capable of discern the 
visible contradiction of an organization that demands democratic practices for all 
other political actors and holds democracy in scorn for itself.  
 
The power of propaganda: inspired by the ‘agit-prop’ style typical of former 
Communist parties, the MST successfully colonized part of civil society in Brazil, 
whom it dominates and whose resources it uses in its favor. Since it is seen as an 
‘organization of the rural poor’, only a minority within progressive sectors dares to 
contest its authoritarian political rationale, even if they are unhappy with practices 
that many times resemble proto-fascist forms of social behavior. Because there is a 
political capillarity linking the MST, the PT’s political field and, more generically, 
‘the Left’, just a few, fearful of political reprisals, confront those practices.  Anyone 
familiar with Brazilian CSOs would probably agree that this is the easiest thesis to 
prove on empirical grounds.   
 
                                                 
22 On the historical burden of conservatism born out of the political domination by agrarian elites 
and their contribution to patterns of social behavior and existing institutions, the classic 
reference is the book by Raimundo Faoro, Os donos do poder, originally published in 1958. 
However, the sharpest analysis on this theme is to be found in Martins (1994).  
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Political impasses in difficult times 
 
The main obstacle to reinvent itself: the MST does not modify its 
organizational structure and political rationale because it was born and configured 
under the control and obsolete vision of its main leader. João Pedro Stédile is, in 
fact, the boss of the organization, using a more appropriate word. He came from 
the MR-8 in the late 1970s23 and it is his orthodox (and rather fragile) Marxism 
that prevents the MST from being an effective political actor in the Brazilian 
political system. Under his leadership he fostered a claque that promotes his figure 
and is capable of bluntly repealing dissenting voices.24 The Movement’s discursive 
homogeneity is remarkable and such standardization was reached after the 
installation of its schools of political training, which were established to 
manufacture a single language for the organization. The first one was formed in 
the remote village of Braga (Rio Grande do Sul) in 1987. It was later transferred 
(and multiplied) to different places. These so-called educational sites are in fact 
spaces to train new militants. After graduation, they blindly repeat the same jargon 
throughout Brazil. In a country so heterogeneous in many aspects, this uniform and 
dogmatic reading about rural realities that are so distinct is another eccentricity of 
the MST, thus confirming its intention of strict control over its militants.  
As a compelling illustration of Stedile’s centrality, one may cite the second 
best known MST leader, José Rainha. He dared to confront the ‘founding father’ 
some years ago and was eventually exiled in the Pontal of Paranapanema (São 
Paulo) alongside his ‘MST of the B’. Rainha emerged as a leader in the state of 
Espírito Santo, where struggles for land reform were never intense. He soon moved 
to lead the MST in the huge area of Pontal do Paranapanema, a western area in 
São Paulo bordering the state of Mato Grosso do Sul. It is an area that has the 
potential of settling approximately 20.000 families, if its legal mess were 
disentangled. Rainha is more pragmatic and does not share an anti-capitalist 
stance, but his political ambitions are notorious. After internal disagreements, the 
national leadership of the MST unauthorized any official relations with him but he 
has maintained the name and the iconography typical of the Movement – hence 
the ironic reference to his parallel organization. Over its history, the organization 
has encountered several dissidents in different regions, but they have been quickly 
expelled and it has never prospered a comrade-like internal discussion about 
strategies or its organizational rationale. 
A related factor to be reckoned with is the role of academics and politicians 
who are associated with agrarian politics whose initiatives reinforce the MST’s 
doctrines. Not emphasizing those who explicitly position themselves in the 
                                                 
23 MR-8 accounts for ‘Revolutionary Movement 8 of October’ in its Portuguese name. It used to be 
one of the most Stalinist left-wing groups in Brazil, and was never a major or influential group, but 
made some noise in the 1980s. Nowadays it is a minuscule group on the verge of extinction. 
24 A good example of this ‘cult of personality’ is to be found in the book Brava Gente, published in 
1999 by the Workers Party publishing house, Fundação Perseu Abramo (the authors are João Pedro 
Stédile and Bernardo Mançano Fernandes). 
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extreme-left and are unconditional supporters of the MST,25 most of the more 
influential political operators in the ‘mainstream left’ are also extremely cautious 
when the Movement is discussed and rarely voice public criticisms, though many 
times are harshly critical when talking behind the curtains. In the academic world 
usually prevails what the most reputed Brazilian specialist in agrarian issues, the 
sociologist José de Souza Martins, epitomizes as crude manifestations of ‘militant 
Sociology’: in practice, it is 
 
the absolute negation of Sociology as a science. Sociologists following 
this orientation commonly use ‘their Sociology’ to impugn the knowledge 
that does not conform to the interests of his/her political party. Or to 
give the appearance of [academic] legitimacy to a form of knowledge 
that was produced without scientific rigor (Martins, in Bastos, 2006, 
141).  
 
In order to illustrate this point, maybe a paradigmatic example is the case of 
Horácio Martins Carvalho, who formerly was a university lecturer in one of the 
most prestigious Brazilian graduate programs in rural development and over the 
years has been a frequent consultant for government agencies and Brazilian 
branches of international organizations. For many years Carvalho has also been a 
sort of MST spokesman (see, for example, Carvalho, 2002) and his analytical 
output finds wide dissemination within the Movement. In a recent and still 
unpublished article, he proposes no less than a renewed search for ‘an autonomous 
peasantry’ capable of severing its ties with capitalist markets. If one remembers the 
deep process of commodification of social life in Brazilian rural areas in the recent 
period, transforming the country in one of the most decisive agricultural producers 
in the world, coupled with the process of urbanization that is emptying the 
countryside, those ideas appear unbelievable. Similar arguments echoing 
problematic, if not outdated, orthodox Marxist readings about agrarian 
development are still common among many Brazilian social scientists, thus 
demonstrating a preference for rhetoric instead of empirical research. In Carvalho’s 
words,  
 
(…) it is my suggestion that the peasantry, whereas permeated by 
several internal contradictions, when reaffirming itself as peasantry 
                                                 
25 Plinio de Arruda Sampaio is an emblematic name of the extreme-left in Brazil when discussing 
agrarian politics. An icon of the Catholic left, he was the Workers Party candidate in São Paulo in 
the early 1990s but later on moved to the extreme-left Party of Socialism and Freedom (PSol). He 
was also president of the Brazilian Association for Land Reform (ABRA) and has always been a sort 
of MST militant. In relation to the Cutrale invasion initially mentioned, he wrote that  
 
there is a criticism to be made in relation to the occupation of the Cutrale 
farm. According to the firm, the occupiers destroyed 7,000 orange trees. 
They made a mistake: they should have destroyed 70,000 (and this 
would be hardly noted in a farm of one million orange trees), in order to 
call attention to the fact that the farm illegally occupies public land with 
the connivance of the Judiciary’ (published in Folha de São Paulo, 5 
December 2009).  
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negates capitalism, even when immersed in the latter – hence its 
‘relative autonomy’. It is a negation made by praxis as it occurs in 
production (…) It will be vulnerable to capitalist offensives if this 
initiative is kept in isolation from the other social struggles by the 
popular classes (…) the construction of peasant autonomy in face of the 
dominant classes will be made not only in face of capital and the 
capitalist class, but also in face of bourgeoisie governments. 
Cooperation among the peasants themselves and with the other rural 
and urban popular classes will affirm the peasantry as a social class, an 
indispensable route to secure the peasant autonomy (Carvalho, 2009, 
passim).    
 
Social demand for land reform: although I am one of the few voices to raise 
this argument, I reaffirm that there is no significant demand for land reform in 
Brazil anymore, so justifying a program of national ambition.26 Here lies the 
fundamental thesis of this article: land reform is a state policy that reflects the 
mutable nature of social and political processes. Therefore, it cannot be historically 
permanent and gradually looses its appeal with the intensification of urbanization 
(although focusing on different arguments, see Bernstein, 2002, who also 
emphasizes ‘the passing of redistributive land reform’ in recent times). The PNAD 
of 2008 emphatically demonstrated that Brazil is approaching a spatial and 
occupational threshold with far-reaching economic and political consequences: in 
its entire history the largest employed population in Brazil had always been the 
agricultural labor force.27 That annual data collection has shown, however, that 
commerce will overcome this historical mark of agriculture sometime this year. Out 
of a total workforce in the country of 92,395 million employees (2008), 16,100 
million were employed in agricultural activities against 16,093 million in the 
commercial sector (industries employed 13,995 million individuals in the same 
year). In the 1950s Brazil reached a turning point when there was a majority of 
dwellers in towns and cities and rural areas were no longer the main place of living 
and now agriculture is not even the largest employer anymore. This is the direct 
result of a spectacular process of technological modernization in agricultural 
activities: for example, whereas production of grains more than doubled and 
experienced a steady rise in the period 1991/2009 (from 57,9 million of tones to 
137,6 million of tones), the corresponding cultivated area observed only a slight 
change of 26% in that same period, increasing from 37,9 million hectares to 47,6 
million hectares (according to official data).     
The urgency of land reform is not correlated with the Gini index per se but 
to actual social demand. If the latter observes an increasing reduction in its political 
appeal with the time, its implementation becomes meaningless, whatever the 
magnitude of land concentration. The Gini index in Brazil is among one of the 
highest in the world (0,854 according to the latest official census) but this is a fact 
that will be part of our long-term rural realities, as soon as land reform becomes 
marginal in the political agenda. The future of Brazil will surely keep a land 
                                                 
26  My arguments are further discussed in Navarro (2009).  
27 PNAD accounts for the ‘National Research of Household Sampling’ in its Portuguese acronym. It 
is an annual data collection under the auspices of the national body in charge of all censuses carried 
out in the country (IBGE).  
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structure marked by a strong presence of family-based agriculture fully integrated 
in capitalist markets (especially in the three southern states) alongside large-scale 
commercial agriculture (which is so dominant in the huge Center-West region). 
Perhaps regional projects to restructure land ownership might find some social 
intelligibility, such as in the Northeastern region, as an example, but nothing 
beyond that scope (Navarro 2001, Silva 2007). 
Social demand for land reform has dramatically fallen in the last fifteen to 
twenty years but the meaning of ‘social demand’ accepts different connotations. Is 
it the ‘potential demand’ or the one that is politically manifested as ‘real demand’? 
Martins (2000) called attention on this subject, emphasizing that social demand for 
land reform in Brazil is the one exclusively materialized by encampments organized 
by landless groups and other public actions in order to put pressure on authorities, 
so that claimers become visible in the political arena (that is, ‘real demand’). This is 
a rare opinion, however, because most of those who have studied land reform are 
inclined to embrace potential demand only as its true manifestation. As it is 
obvious, there is an enormous quantitative difference if one takes into 
consideration one or another notion and usually advocates of land reform recur to 
the latter notion (Del Grossi and Gasques, 2000, Silva and Del Grossi, 2000). I 
understand, however, that the idea of potential demand is untenable in face of 
political realities in the country and undesirable from the perspective of distinct 
social interests under democratic regimes. Land reform is a policy that emerged (in 
the mid-1990s) as a result of democratization and much pressure by distinct social 
actors. It is only when such a demand becomes politicized, that is, expressed in 
actions and social struggles (‘real demand’) that it is materialized in social life and 
authorities must respond with policy proposals and projects. It does not make 
much sense to use potential demand for land reform if the presumable interested 
citizens in its implementation are hardly visible in political terms under democratic 
regimes (an argument that is only reasonable, it must be insisted, under this 
democratic premise, which will allow different social groups, including the most 
subordinate ones, to freely organize themselves and dispute their interests).        
On the other hand, no one would be brave enough to raise economic 
reasons in order to defend land reform, echoing the typical arguments of the 1950s 
when this policy was emphasized as a condition to boost the internal market. Even 
social justifications became somewhat empty after the CCT-inspired program ‘Bolsa 
Família’ was instituted in 2004 under the presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 
(2003-2010). It has been relatively successful in reducing poverty in the country 
(Barros, 2009). Moreover, ‘Bolsa Família’ is strongly contributing to reduce chances 
of mobilization by the MST. This negative correlation was first suggested by a 
journalist, Eduardo Scolese, who compared the distribution of ‘Bolsa’ and land 
occupations28.  
                                                 
28 His article was published in Folha de São Paulo, 16 April 2007. According to official data, the 
number of beneficiaries of ‘Bolsa Família’ jumped from 3,6 million families in 2003 to 12 million in 
2009 and the total amount distributed by the government increased from R$ 7,2 billion to R$ 32,9 
billion in the same period. As a result, according to one specialist, Marcelo Néri, from Fundação 
Getúlio Vargas, poverty in Brazil was cut in ten percentage points, from 27.5% in 2001 to 16.2% of 
the total population (in 2008). The same economist anticipates that by 2015, if this policy persists, 
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One of the most reputed Brazilian experts in rural statistics, Rodolfo 
Hoffman has added in a recent interview even more nuances about the diminishing 
importance of land redistribution as a measure to reduce social inequalities. Asked 
about the impact of this policy in these times, he argued that the levels of wages in 
the Brazilian countryside are too low, when compared to similar strata in urban 
areas. This fact, associated with the spatial distribution of the population in urban 
and rural households, makes a radical reform of the state welfare institutions much 
more relevant than land reform. In his own words,  
 
The distribution of income of all occupations by employed individuals in 
Brazil has an average of R$ 1,036 and a corresponding Gini index of 
0.521. For those employed in the agricultural sector these figures are R$ 
615 and 0.531. It is realized, therefore, that inequality is relatively high 
in that sector. But it is incorrect to think that agricultural incomes have 
an important effect of increasing inequality in the country. The average 
payment in agriculture is relatively low and corresponds to 63% of the 
average payment in industry and 54% in the service sector. Those who 
are employed in agriculture represent only 11% of the total workforce 
and receive only 7% of the total income received by all employed 
individuals. Since the total payment of pensions and welfare benefits 
corresponds to the double of the total of payments of employees in 
agriculture, I may affirm that a reform in the welfare system has a 
greater potential in reducing inequality in income distribution than land 
reform (…) the total income of pensions and welfare benefits 
represented [in 2008] 18% of the total declared income in Brazil, 
whereas the income of those employed in agriculture corresponded to 
only 7%. This relation changed a lot in the last four decades and will go 
on changing. It does not mean that land reform should be discarded. It 
merely means to recognize that the relative importance of land reform is 
not the same of forty years ago.29 
   
However, it will require much courage in government circles to restructure 
the existing government’s rationale in this field because of the strong influence by 
the MST over the federal agency in charge of land reform. As a curiosity with long 
term implications it might be noted that the current head of INCRA was recruited 
by João Pedro Stédile in the early 1980s.  With others they founded a small NGO 
that still exists in Porto Alegre (whose name is CAMP), which was the embryo of 
the Landless Movement, a revealing detail that illustrates how much enmeshed are 
these relations. If unchanged, the existing national policy will persist as an 
institutional surrealism that grossly wastes public funds and is moved only by 
inertia and social corporatism.  
Looming is the dismaying productive performance and evasion of 
beneficiaries in most rural settlements established in the last fourteen years, when 
the national program of land reform finally entered the stage. To date, there is not 
                                                                                                                                                
only 8% of the Brazilians will be considered to be poor, a quarter of the total that existed in 1993 
(see Correio Braziliense, 2 January 2010 and O Estado de São Paulo, 3 January 2010. Ravallion, on 
the other hand, comparing the efficacy of such policies in Brazil, India and China, has emphasized 
the relative success of Brazilian social policies (Ravallion, 2009).  
29 Hoffman, Rodolfo. 2009. Desafio de uma geração. O Globo, 27 December 2009.  
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a credible national evaluation of rural settlements that could inform about an array 
of indicators, social and economic. In the recent period, only case studies 
commissioned by the Federal Government or occasional research by some 
university specialists threw some lights on specific settlements or group of 
settlements in different regions and, regrettably enough, many of these studies 
were too ideologically-oriented and had clear ex-ante conclusions about the overall 
performance of settlements, in particular those under the influence of the MST. On 
the other hand, the recent Agricultural Census launched in October 2009 did not 
offer more lights on this topic and, in fact, because of methodological faults, did 
not count approximately 800 thousand families (sic) in the rural settlements 
established for the national program of land reform.30    
In relation to the settlements’ productive results a single statistical 
comparison may be enough: in the period 1995-2008 approximately 80 million 
hectares were expropriated for land reform (this is an area that corresponds to 1,5 
the size of France) and there are now an estimate 8,360 rural settlements occupied 
by a population of 920,861 thousand families (according to official statistics of 
INCRA). However, the productive output of these settlements is almost negligible 
in most of the country, a stark contrast vis-à-vis the exuberant output of 
commercial agriculture (family-based and large-scale taken together). The latter 
group of farmers cultivates almost the same area and transformed Brazil into one of 
the most important agricultural players in the world. 
The best research on land evasions to date is the unpublished dissertation by 
Mello (2006). His findings demonstrate that evasion of beneficiaries in rural 
settlements shows an inverse correlation with social cohesion and nearly no 
significant relation with material conditions. This is a disastrous finding for the 
MST, because it recruits landless workers mainly on ideological grounds and/or 
loyalty to the organization.  Social origins and former social networks are irrelevant 
criteria for the organization. As a result, it can be affirmed that the domination of 
the MST in rural settlements is, in fact, a factor that stimulates evasion of poor rural 
families in many regions. 
But this is not all. One of the most intriguing studies about land reform in 
Brazil is the technical report written by Marques in 2007. He works for INCRA and 
his study compared the costs of implementing land access via two different 
mechanisms; the legal one, when a property is expropriated and until the new rural 
settlement is formed there is a long rite of legal steps, and the second one, which is 
land acquisition. His study demonstrated that the second route to collect land for 
redistribution is much faster and cheaper and soon became the favourite route 
taken by the Government. His study indicates that land reform in Brazil, in fact, is 
not a process of transferring land rights (which is the fundamental premise of land 
reform) but is merely becoming a state mechanism of land acquisition. However, if 
the costs he surveyed in his research are compared to those of several studies that 
demonstrated a third mechanism, which is ‘negotiated land reform’ (sometimes 
also called ‘market-based land reform’), then the picture becomes even more 
                                                 
30 See Pedroso, Maria Thereza Macedo. 2009. Podemos acreditar no Censo? (Unpublished article 
available in http://www.assessoriadopt.org/agrario.htm). For a description about rural settlements 
in Brazil, perhaps the best book is by Sparovek (2003), but see also Leite (2004).  
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problematic for advocates of land expropriation (Sparovek, 2009). This third 
mechanism, proposed by the World Bank some years ago, is by far the cheapest, 
thus making access to land via expropriation an irrational public policy. Because of 
political implications, however, Brazilian authorities are not prepared to reckon 
these differences and promote changes in the course of the national program, 
insisting whenever possible with the most costly mechanism.        
The greatest political deficit: which is the actual legitimacy of the MST? 
Surely no one knows, although there are voices that boast its existence. Its 
presumable leaders were chosen by whom and when?31 Were they elected in a 
public space, as expected in any consolidated democratic order? Without 
legitimacy and the persistent refusal by the organization to openly discuss and fine-
tune its public demands and forms of social struggle, why should society kneel 
down to the political impositions regularly announced by its leaders? Not being a 
membership-based organization, which is the social basis of the Movement? Those 
members of its rank-and-file, either militants or sympathizers, are they voluntary 
followers because they trust and believe in the MST or because they have no 
choice, after being recruited in rural settlements controlled by the Movement, 
where the organization manages (public) resources and politically selects its 
favored settlers and militants? It is rather unfortunate that hitherto the Movement 
did not pay any attention to these questions, let alone offered convincing answers 
to these politically embarrassing themes.  
It is not the case of listing the most usual malpractices and analyzing the 
most emblematic social processes in rural settlements under the control of the MST 
and promisingly the literature by Brazilian social scientists gradually reaches 
analytical independence and is now producing reliable findings. After an initial 
research report I have written in the early 1990s (but never published, though read 
by many colleagues in the Brazilian academic world), when I discussed the 
trajectory of the first rural settlement where the MST tried to impose a collective 
organization of production (Navarro, 1994), in recent years the number of research 
documents resulting from rigorous and independent research are on the rise. One 
of these researchers is Eliane Brenneisen, who has written several acute research 
pieces, since her pioneering dissertation (also concluded in 1994) and, in particular, 
her PhD thesis, later published as a book (Brenneisen, 2004, 2004a). The collection 
of articles by Martins (2003) is also a remarkable example of empirical research 
that focuses on some of the questions briefly mentioned above.   
The major question unanswered: it is puzzling that Brazilian authorities have 
never raised the theme of the institutionalization and democratization of the MST. 
Since it survives primordially on public funds, the State has presumably the right, if 
not the duty, of demanding that change, at least to make the organization 
accountable, if society’s resources are appropriated by the Movement. 
                                                 
31 The national congresses organized by the MST, from the first one (Curitiba, 1985) to the fifth and 
latest one held in Brasilia (2007) are mainly public showcases and in fact do not deliberate on any 
relevant issue, following the cannons of ‘democratic centralism’ typical of Leninist organizations. 
Most importantly, at the end of its latest congress, the final manifesto was typical of these critical 
times: out of 18 demands listed, only three of them referred to land reform and related themes.  
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Requirements of transparency and publicity are monotonously required for all 
political actors but, oddly enough, only the Movement is allowed to keep its 
position outside the legal constraints of the system. If the MST reacts against this 
change, because of the original ideological fetish that inspired its foundation, only 
the state can force or insist on its political integration.   
This political pressure on the Movement is necessary not only for the logical 
reasons stated above, but also to prevent its transformation into an extremist 
organization. Being encroached by recent developments in the country, the MST’s 
leaders may be tempted to harden its organizational format and launch even more 
adventurous and irrational actions in different parts of the country. After thirty 
years of existence, the accumulated political richness of the Movement, on the 
other hand, cannot be wasted in face of its potential transformation into a marginal 
small group. Despite its internal authoritarian logic, the MST has contributed 
enormously for the democratization of social relations in Brazilian rural areas and it 
would be regrettable if this dense political capital could not be used anymore to 
enlighten public debates on the possible agrarian development routes in Brazil. The 
legality of the MST would be an important step forward to enhance social 
organization in the Brazilian rural areas.     
The main achievement: in reality, it is not to keep alive the idea of land 
reform in the national agenda, even if under growing disinterest by the majority of 
Brazilians. The major victory of the MST is essentially political. That is, to dismantle 
the correlation of social forces that has always been a trademark in the Brazilian 
countryside. This is a significant triumph demonstrated by an unquestionable 
reality:  there is no single rural private property protected at the moment, if the 
MST decides to conquer it. With the process of democratization, the rule of Law in 
Brazil became more tolerant and even police repression was softened, with no 
resemblance to the terrifying rural violence of the past. Under these conditions, the 
organization may invade whatever rural property it so decides, with a good 
probability of keeping it forever.32  
                                                 
32 A telling illustration about the confusion of state powers nowadays in Brazil that illuminates how 
Justice became more tolerant is a recent interview by a federal prosecutor in the town of Ribeirão 
Preto, in the interior of São Paulo. That town is located at the heart of sugar cane production in 
Brazil and is a region of large scale rural properties, thus symbolizing ‘agribusiness’ and the 
prominence of agrarian capital. According to the Brazilian Constitution, these prosecutors enjoy an 
enormous power and in practice they pay little obedience to any superior coordinator. The 
interviewee is a very active prosecutor specialized in environmental issues and, declaring himself a 
socialist, he insisted that the ‘Ministério Público’ is a political agent that promotes the Constitution, 
also separating ‘progressive organizations’ from other ones, including the MST among the first 
ones. When asked if land reform was his responsibility, he responded that ‘The role of the 
‘Ministério Público’ is clear: to defend the social function of land and a diffuse right to land reform, 
sing the juridical instruments laid down by the Constitution and several laws for that purpose, also 
making alliances with sectors of civil society with the same objective’. The ‘Ministério Público’ is a 
branch of the Brazilian system of Justice that was greatly enhanced after the Constitution of 1988 
and has financial autonomy and legal attributions that given their members almost an absolute 
freedom of action. See Goulart, Marcelo. 2009. Temos que fazer a reforma agrária que o governo  
não faz. Folha de São Paulo, 21 December 2009. Despite the bourgeoning literature addressing the 
‘judicialization of politics’, his confusion here is obvious: land reform is a policy decided by 
government and the Judiciary should only oversee it from a legal point of view.    
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The greatest irony, however, is that this decisive turn is occurring when 
demand for land is rapidly diminishing in all rural regions, eroded by an 
unstoppable pace of urbanization. The result is a pyrrhic victory: when land reform 
was finally made viable in Brazil, its implementation gradually stagnated, because 




What about the future? Nowadays the MST confronts its twilight and has 
only one way forward, that is, its institutionalization and internal democratization, 
transforming itself into a formal organization with a sound mandate in favor of the 
rural poor. If it decides to maintain its present structure and rationale, it will only 
accentuate its slow agony. The MST was born to demand access to land for the 
rural poor, but this policy is gradually passing away.34 In a recent interview, the 
MST main leader has even hinted about current political difficulties, stressing that  
(…) we are though a moment of reflection, thinking about a new model 
to put into practice. In the 70s and 80s it was enough to invade lands 
and so obtaining social support that resulted in political pressure. 
Nowadays land invasions do not bring allies to our side. Therefore it does 
not interest us anymore. We are searching for new alternatives to find 
allies. And the most compatible way so far is an alliance with urban 
workers”.35 
 
 Though a reference made in passing, it is an illuminating turnaround 
because social struggles by the rural poor have been historically centered on land 
invasions, in Brazil and elsewhere. To downplay land invasions as the main political 
tool for the Movement has the same meaning as abandoning strikes as a form of 
                                                 
33  “In the 1950s, 8 million people migrated to the cities (about 24% of the total rural population 
that was counted in Brazil in 1950); nearly 14 million in the 1960s (about 36% of the total rural 
population in 1960); 17 million people in the 1970s (approximately 40% of the rural population in 
1970). Over three decades the awesome total of 39 million people [migrated to the cities]” (Mello 
and Novais, 2009, 21).  According to the last available census, the urban population in the country 
is estimated in 85% out of the total. As an illustration, one may check the case of Rio Grande do 
Sul, where the Movement was born and is still active, recruiting especially settlers from “its 
settlements” to promote an array of forms of pressure (because the actual landless population 
demanding access to land drastically diminished in the last three decades). In this state, in the period 
1970-2000 the rural population diminished from almost half of the total (47%) to 18% (Lisboa and 
Bagolin, 2009, p. 54). Official estimates locate only 14% of the total population in rural areas in 
2008.    
34  Stédile himself reckoned the impasse experienced by land reform in Brazil. Insisting on his 
staunch anti-capitalist platform, undauntedly suggested that “only the defeat of neoliberalism will 
create conditions for land reform in Brazil”. See his interview published in Época, Rio de Janeiro, 2 
July 2007. Another MST national coordinator, Gilmar Mauro (himself a Stédile’s follower), echoed 
this vision, when affirming that the notion of a classic redistributive land reform failed in Brazil and 
the “new land reform” proposed by the MST would be an environmentally-sound model of 
producing health food and raw materials. In short, a model for the market and a struggle that aims 
at economically integrating small farmers. It is a political objective, therefore, far from any anti-
capitalist orientation. His interview is in 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u491141.shtml [accessed in 17 October 2009].   
35 Interview by João Pedro Stédile in Zero Hora, 28 January 2010. 
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pressure for industrial workers. Anyone who is informed about Brazilian politics and 
the possibilities of materializing that famous rural-urban alliance so much incensed 
in socialist literature over time knows that this possible political strategy is doomed 
to immediate failure.     
Land reform was implemented for the first time in Brazilian history over the 
last fifteen years under the existing legal framework but it is definitely reaching its 
limits of viability in our times. Faced by a challenging juncture, the MST has 
unsuccessfully tried to disseminate a new agenda so far (‘war on science, war on 
modern agriculture, and war on the agrarian bourgeoisie’). Not a boutade, in fact 
this slogan reflects the impasses swirling the Movement in recent times. An 
empirical illustration is perhaps enough to demonstrate the political vacuity of 
those intentions. A large firm that has invested in Brazilian rural areas, after 
observing some attempts of invasion by the MST, invited its leadership for a 
meeting in order to exchange their views and check possibilities of collaboration. 
One influential member of the national MST directorate attended the meeting and 
his was the opening phrase,  
 
(…) we do not have any interest in negotiating around this table (…) 
because we are against the presence of [x] in Brazil. It is not our practice 
to sit with businessmen because of our political methodology (…) It is 
not personal but a disagreement about the world project you have and 
ours (…) I am here with the mandate of avoiding negotiations and also 
to voice our political perspective and our denunciations of problems that 
are occurring…’ (sic).36  
As obvious, this threat by the MST envoy is nonsensical, especially when 
one remembers that the organization, in fact, does not exist, from a legal point of 
view. The firm represented on the other side of the table in the meeting, in its turn, 
is regularly registered and operates under the rule of Law, being completely 
accountable not only for its activities in rural areas, but also from all legal aspects. It 
is difficult to imagine a more surreal dialogue.       
Built inside a political cul-de-sac and lack of long term perspectives, this 
attempt of renewing its agenda shows, in fact, a visible despair, so demonstrated 
by many preposterous initiatives pursued in different rural regions over the recent 
period. They are motivated either by its non democratic organizational 
anachronism or because it insists with an anti-modern ideology. If it persists, the 










                                                 
36 For obvious reasons additional details about this meeting cannot be revealed. But the meeting 
was recorded and there is a transcript.  
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O artigo sintetiza aspectos centrais que marcaram a história do Movimento 
dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) nos anos recentes. Tenta-se demonstrar 
que atualmente aquela organização experimenta crescentes impasses, em parte 
devido à urbanização e seus impactos nas percepções sociais sobre a trajetória da 
reforma agrária no Brasil. Problemáticos aspectos típicos do Movimento são 
listados e brevemente discutidos, das escolhas organizacionais ao controvertido 
repertório do MST de suas lutas implementadas no sentido de adensar a sua força 
política. O artigo também discute desafios mais recentemente observados, os quais 
ameaçam a própria existência da organização no futuro próximo. 
Palavras-chave: Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra; MST; 
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